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CORPORATIONS-INSTALLMENT STOCK REPURCHASE-SECURED CLAIM
SuRvIVas BANKRUPTCY-In re National Tile & Terrazzo Co., 537 F.2d
329 (9th Cir. 1976).
In re National Tile & Terrazzo Co.' allows, for the first time in
the Ninth Circuit, a former stockholders secured claim arising out of
the corporate repurchase of stock to be provable in bankruptcy. This
holding departs from the traditional rejection of such claims in favor
of other creditors, and is unaffected by California's newly enacted cor-
porations code.2
I. FACTS
Josephine Paterna owned 600 shares of the common stock of Na-
tional Tile and Terrazzo Co., a California corporation. In December
of 1967 she sold her shares back to the corporation for $39,000, ac-
cepting $3,000 in cash and a promissory note for the additional $36,000.
The promissory note was secured by a deed of trust on certain real
property owned by the corporation. At the time of the agreement,
National deducted the entire purchase price from its earned surplus
account in compliance with the California Corporations Code.3
The corporation made regular payments to Paterna on the promis-
sory note until May 20, 1971. A month later, National filed a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy. The corporation had no earned income
and insufficient assets to pay all creditors in full. Paterna was still
owed $20,351.66, and she filed her claim of lien in bankruptcy. 4 The
1. 537 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1976).
2. Law of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, § 7, [1975] Cal. Stat. -, as amended, Law of
Aug. 27, 1976, ch. 641, [1976] Cal. Stat. - [hereinafter cited as Gen'l Corp. Law].
3. Section 1707 provides in part:
A corporation may also purchase shares issued by it, or by a corporation of which
it is subsidiary, in any of the following cases:
(c) out of earned surplus....
CAL. Coap. CODE ANN. § 1707 (West 1955).
Section 1709 provides in part:
Upon any authorized purchase of shares issued by the corporation . . . out of
earned . . . surplus the earned . . . surplus shall be reduced by an amount equal
to the purchase price of such shares.
CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1709 (West 1955).
4. The trustee in bankruptcy had liquidated the real property on which Paterna had
her lien and placed the proceeds in a holding account pending the adjudication of
Paterna's claim. Brief for Appellant at 4, In re National Tile & Terrazzo Co., 537 F.2d
329 (9th Cir. 1976).
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district court affirmed -the bankruptcy judge's denial of the lien on the
basis of In re Belmetals Manufacturing Co.5 The district court con-
strued the Belmetals decision to mean that a promissory note, whether
or not secured, given by a corporation in exchange for its stock is un-
enforceable when the corporation becomes insolvent.0
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and
upheld Paterna's claim. The court noted that Belmetals stood for the
proposition that Paterna's promissory note was unenforceable under
California law--a conclusion expressly conceded by Paterna.8  How-
ever, it was a question of first impression whether the lien created by
the deed of trust survived when the note it was to secure became un-
enforceable. The court found inadequate precedent in California law
to decide this issue and concluded on its own analysis that a lien arising
out of a valid stock repurchase is enforceable.
I. FACTORS IN THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision the court faced a number of considerations
which will be examined. First, the note-holding former stockholder
traditionally has an inferior status in bankruptcy. Second, for statu-
tory and common law reasons most courts have found a note arising
from a stock repurchase to be unenforceable when the debtor corpora-
tion becomes insolvent. Third, if the note were secured by real prop-
erty, the security may be of no consequence because under the majority
rule the lien's viability rests upon the note's enforceability. This case-
note examines the National court's treatment of these issues and the
reasoning employed by the court to reach a result contrary to the tra-
ditional rejection of a former stockholder's claim in bankruptcy.
A. The Inferior Status of a Former Stockholder
in Bankruptcy
Installment repurchasing of stock,9 as practiced by National Tile
5. 299 F. Supp. 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1969), af'd sub nom. Eranosian v. England, 437
F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1971).
6. 537 F.2d at 330. See In re Belmetals Mfg. Co., 299 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (N.D.
Cal. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Eranosian v. England, 437 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1971).
7. See notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text for an analysis of the holding in
Belnetals which indicates that the National court may have misconstrued Belmetals.
8. 537 F.2d at 330.
9. The repurchase of stock by publicly held corporations has been an increasingly
common phenomenon in recent years. Between 1954 and 1963 more than fifty percent
of the 1,214 corporations then on the New York Stock Exchange repurchased their own
stock, often reflecting their mounting cash surplus. Buchalter, Purchase by a Corpora-
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and Terrazzo, is often necessary for a small corporation with limited
liquidity in order to avoid a cash flow problem. 10 It has been hindered,
however, by the refusal of the courts to treat the note-holding former
stockholder on a par with any creditor. Should the corporation become
bankrupt while money is still owing on the stockholder's promissory
note, the former stockholder has generally been unable to recover, and
almost never on a par with other creditors, due to statutory and com-
mon law limitations." These limitations have been extended to pro-
hibit installment payments to. the former stockholder during the cor-
poration's insolvency and to bar the former stockholder's recovery in
bankruptcy. This outcome corresponds to the bankruptcy rule that
creditors recover completely before shareholders receive any return on
their investment.'
2
The bias against a former shareholder has two bases. The first
is the risk inherent in the nature of the original investment. Where the
stockholder is gambling on the corporation's success, the creditor is
merely rendering goods or services as part of a bargain supported by
consideration. The second is the courts' historic view that the cor-
porate repurchase of stock is fraught with opportunity for fraud. 13  It
gives insiders a way to cash in on their investment just before insolvency,
leaving nothing for creditors. Thus, courts have been wary of this
type of transaction. These two factors have made it almost impos-
lion of its Shares: Corporate Cannibalism Without Indigestion, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 446
(1966); Guthart, More Companies Are Buying Back Their Stock, 43 HARV. Bus. REV.
40, 42 (March-April 1965). Some reasons for repurchase in addition to the investment
of a cash surplus are the compromise of a claim, compensation of a dissenting share-
holder, funding of an agreement with employees such as a stock option plan, and the
elimination of fractional shares. See generally 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CAL!-
FORNIA CoRPoRATroN LAWS § 147 (4th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINP &
STERLING].
10. Small corporations are rarely motivated by an excessive cash surplus as is a large,
public corporation. A typical reason for the repurchase of stock in a small corporation
is the death of one of the stockholders who was also active in the management of the
business. See Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th
Cir. 1960). "
11. See Jarroll Coal Co. v. Lewis, 210 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1954); Robinson v. Wange-
mann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935); In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 F. 357 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 234 U.S. 760 (1914); In re Bell Tone Records, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 806
(D.N.J. 1949); Quinn-Marshall Co. v. McDaniels Co., 5 F. Supp. 937 (M.D.N.C.
1934). But see Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 163 A.2d 140 (NJ. 1932), where the
court, upholding the minority view, sustained a stockholder's claim in bankruptcy. See
generally Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 758 (1956).
12. Hoover Steel Ball Co. v. Schafer Ball Bearings Co., 106 A. 471 (N.J. Eq. 1919).
13. BALLANTINE & STERLING, supra note 9, § 146. See note 21 infra for the English
rationale on the opportunity for fraud in stock repurchases.
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sible for a former shareholder holding a promissory note at the time
of bankruptcy to recover when competing with other creditors. Ingen-
ious schemes have been unable to escape this result in jurisdictions
adhering to the traditional view. 4
In two recent cases, however, Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co.15
and Williams v. Nevelow,'0 which concerned installment repurchasing,
the former stockholder was allowed to recover on a par with other
creditors where the stockholder's note was secured by a chattel mort-
gage. Both cases took advantage of the bankruptcy rule which gives
the secured creditor a favored position over the unsecured creditor,' 7
but they circumvented the rule of secured transactions in real property
which bases the viability of the lien on the enforceability of the under-
lying note.' 8
In Tracy the court based its holding on the validity of the lien, find-
ing that the rights of the former stockholder to the proceeds of the prop-
erty covered by the mortgages vested when they were executed.'
Williams, interpreting the Texas Corporation Act, found the promis-
sory note, and thus the lien, enforceable.20 The Ninth Circuit in
National followed the former path and found the lien, but not the note,
enforceable. An examination of California law will indicate why.
B. The Enforceability of the Note Under the
California Corporations Code
In the United States, 2 ' courts have allowed corporations to repur-
chase their own stock if the repurchase would not cause prejudice to
14. For an interesting attempt, see United States v. General Geophysical Co., 296
F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961).
15. 153 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1967).
16. 513 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974).
17. Encumbered assets are applied in bankruptcy first to the claims of secured cred-
itors before they are available for general creditors. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRIXETCy §
60.01 (14th ed. 1975). A secured creditor may file a claim as a general creditor for
any amounts owing to him not already satisfied by the lien proceeds. Id. § 57.07. The
secured interest is favored because the recordation of the lien gives notice to subsequent
creditors that certain assets of the corporation have a prior claim on them should bank-
ruptcy occur. The law expects subsequent creditors to act on such knowledge in extend-
ing credit.
18. G. OBsoRNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 267 (1951).
19. 153 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. 1967).
20. 513 S.W.2d at 537-38.
21. In England stock repurchases are not allowed. The English courts reason
that private funds, not corporate capital, should be put to such a purpose. For a
leading case on the subject and an explanation for distrusting stock repurchasing,
see Trevor v. Whitworth, [1887] 12 App. Cas. 409, 416-17.
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the rights of creditors.22 This common law "no prejudice" rule took
the statutory form of the insolvency cut-off rule, which specified that
no stock repurchase could be made if the corporation were insolvent
or if such a purchase would lead to its insolvency. 23 When the in-
solvency cut-off rule was extended to installment repurchases, most
courts interpreted this provision to mean that solvency was required
both at the time of purchase and at the time of each subsequent pay-
ment.24  Under this interpretation, if a stockholder receives a promis-
sory note as the result of a stock repurchase made when the corpora-
tion is solvent, then that note is voidable if the corporation later de-
clares bankruptcy.
25
Complicating the insolvency cut-off rule has been the more recent
statutory requirement in California and other states2 that a stock re-
purchase, except for specified statutory reasons, 27 must be made out
of earned surplus.28 Under this requirement, the entire amount of
the cash purchase price must be available in earned surplus and must
be deducted from earned surplus on the corporate books at the time
of repurchase. 9 While the aim of this requirement is to protect creditors
22. See Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HAnv. L.
REv. 303 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Herwitz]. California generally did not permit
stock repurchase until 1929 when the first comprehensive corporations law became ef-
fective, which permitted repurchase of stock under close restrictions. Ballantine,
Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 479
(1931). See, e.g., England v. Christensen, 243 Cal. App. 2d 413, 422-23, 52 Cal. Rptr.
402, 408-09 (1966) on California's cautious policy towards stock repurchase,
23. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1708 (West 1955).
24. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1935).
25. Id. at 758.
26. Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have comparable provisions. See MODEL
Bus. CoP. Acr ANN. § 6, 3 (2d ed. 1971).
27. A repurchase out of stated capital may be made to collect or compromise debts,
to eliminate fractional shares, to relieve a dissenting shareholder, or pursuant to a stock
option plan. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1706 (West 1955).
28. Id. § 1707(c). Many states enforcing the "earned surplus" requirement have
defined earned surplus in terms equivalent to those found in the Model Business Cor-
poration Act, which provides:
"Earned surplus" means the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the
balance of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation,
or from the latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an application of its capi-
tal surplus or stated capital or otherwise, after deducting subsequent distributions
to shareholders and transfers to stated capital and capital surplus to the extent such
distributions and transfers are made out of earned surplus.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 2, 1(1) (2d ed. 1971). California has adopted no
statutory definition of earned surplus, although it does have an earned surplus require-
ment. BALLANTiNE & STERLING, supra note 9, § 127.
29. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1709 (West 1955). See note 3 supra.
19761 RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
by insuring that stock repurchases do not deplete the company's capital
while leaving nothing for creditors in bankruptcy, this provision has
made installment repurchase of stock more troublesome.
Courts have been uncertain when to apply the earned surplus re-
quirement. Should it be applied only at the time of purchase (in the
case of installment repurchase at the time of the agreement and initial
exchange of consideration) or, like the insolvency requirement, also
at the time of payment?30 The Model Business Corporation Act treats
these questions by indicating that the earned surplus requirement should
be applied only at the time of purchase, whereas the insolvency cut-off
rule should be applied both at the time of purchase and at the time
of payment."
The present California statute fails to treat separately the question
of payment and gives no indication when the earned surplus require-
ment of section 1707 (c) 32 or the insolvency cut-off rule of section
170833 is to be applied. These sections simply indicate that a corpora-
tion may "purchase" shares out of earned surplus and shall not "pur-
chase" shares if such purchase might reasonably lead to insolvency.
30. In Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir.
1960), the court avoided the potential severity of applying the earned surplus require-
ment both at the time of purchase and at the time of payment by applying it only at
the time of payment. The court regarded the initial purchase agreement as conditional
in order to avoid potential danger to creditors. See Herwitz, supra note 22, at 311-23
for a criticism of this interpretation of the earned surplus requirement. See generally
Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1975).
31. The Model Act was amended in 1957 to read:
No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent.
MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN., § 6, I1f (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis added). The Texas
Business Corporation Act, which was interpreted in Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d
535 (Tex. 1974), was amended in accordance with the Model Act to include the word
"payment" in the insolvency provision. The accompanying comment expressly indicates
that the intent of the amendment was to apply the insolvency limitation both at the time
of purchase and at the time of payment, while restricting the earned surplus requirement
to the time of purchase. TEXAs Bus. CoRP. Act art. 2.03(D) (F) (Supp. 1975-76).
32. Section 1707 provides in pertinent part:
A corporation may also purchase shares issued by it ... in any of the following
cases:
(c) Subject to any limitations contained in its articles, out of earned surplus....
CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 1707 (West 1955).
33. Section 1708 provides in pertinent part:
A corporation shall not purchase or redeem shares issued by it . . . in any case
when there is reasonable ground for believing that the corporation is unable, or,
by such purchase or redemption, will be rendered unable, to satisfy its debts and
liabilities when they fall due ....
.CAL, CoRp. CoDE ANN. & 1708 (West 1955).
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In applying these standards to the facts of National, the problem of
interpretation becomes apparent. First, if the word "purchase" is under-
stood to include subsequent payments in addition to the initial trans-
action, Paterna's note is probably unenforceable since at the time of
payment the corporation had no earned surplus and was insolvent.3t
Second, if "purchase" not only means the initial transaction for purposes
of the earned surplus requirement, but means both the initial trans-
action and subsequent payments for purposes of the insolvency cut-
off, the note is probably unenforceable because at the time of subse-
quent payments the corporation was insolvent. This is the interpre-
tation of the Model Act.m Third, if "purchase" means only the initial
transaction for purposes of both sections, the note is probably enforce-
able because the corporation had adequate earned surplus to cover
the purchase price and, of course, was solvent.36
. The first and second alternatives extend the common law "no pre-
judice" rule to encompass installment repurchasing.r However, a
strict statutory examination yields a result closer to the third interpre-
tation.38 The California Commercial Code defines "purchase" as
34. But if payment is defined to include the transfer of a negotiable promissory note,
as is suggested by the definition of "value" under the Texas Business and Commerce
Code, the note would be enforceable. See TEx. CODE Bus. & Comr. § 1.201(44) (1968);
Hartmann & Wilson, Payment for Repurchased Shares Under the Texas Business Corpo-
ration Act, 26 Sw. LI. 725, 735 (1972).
35. See note 31 supra.
36. The concurring opinion in National points out that a transaction like Paterna's
is a fully executed contract under California law. 537 F.2d at 333 (Real, J.,
concurring). According to this reasoning, the third alternative is thus the appropriate
statutory interpretation in an installment repurchase transaction where all the stock was
exchanged for a promissory note. As the majority opinion points out, this reasoning
begs the question. The issue of whether payments may be made on a stock repurchase
'when there is no earned surplus and the corporation is insolvent remains whether or not
the contract is termed "executed." Id. at 330 n.2.
37. Since the aim of the rule was to preserve assets for creditors at the time of insol-
vency, it did not matter when the initial transaction was made or whether it was valid
at the time. The classic articulation of this position stated:
When such a transaction is had, regardless of the good faith of the parties, it is
essential to its validity that there be sufficient surplus to retire the stock, without
prejudice to creditors, at the time payment is made out of assets.
Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1935) (emphasis added).
In McConnell v. Butler, 402 F.2d 362, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1968), the Ninth Circuit
analogized to Robinson, where a note had been given, and held that exchanging stock
for debentures was not "payment."
38. Using statutory interpretation, the court in Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d 535
(Tex. 1974), found numerous reasons for upholding the claim. First, Texas law clearly
specifies that earned surplus must be present "at the time of purchase," indicating that
the earned surplus requirement does not apply to subsequent payments. Id. at 537.
Second, a different holding would in effect "require as" much as double the amount" of
260
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"taking by . . . mortgage . . . [or] lien . ... " Thus, the install-
ment repurchase transaction in National constituted a "purchase" under
California law. Following this line of reasoning, the purchase referred
to in section 1707(c) and section 1708 takes place at the time the
secured note is given to a stockholder in exchange for his stock and,
thereafter, the corporation is simply making payments on a negotiable
secured instrument, an activity not prohibited by the statute.
40
The distinctions required for this statutory analysis have been lost
by courts applying California law. Indeed, recent Ninth Circuit de-
cisions in this area have displayed considerable confusion in their
analysis. 41  The most recent case applying California law to the in-
stallment repurchase issue was Belmetals,42 which was understood by
the National court to bar any payment when it could not .be made
from earned surplus, although the facts in Belmetals make that conclu-
sion questionable. The Belmetals court found the repurchase transac-
tion invalid from the outset because the corporation never had adequate
earned surplus to repurchase the shares in question.43 The court's
additional conclusion-that even if the transaction were not void from
earned surplus. Not only would the purchase price be deducted from the present. earned
surplus account, but in addition each individual payment would also have to be made
out of earned surplus. Id. at 538. Third, even if the earned surplus requirement were
extended to subsequent payments, the unenforceability of the stockholder's claim would
not necessarily follow because "[tihe issuance of a secured negotiable instrument could
be considered 'payment' for the repurchased stock," and nowhere does the statute specify
that secured instruments must be paid from earned surplus. Id. at 539. Fourth, "[i]f
fraud or bad faith or conduct misleading to the creditors were shown, equitable ground
for rescission of the purchase and the foreclosure would be established" and the statute
would not need to be distorted to support unenforceability if fraud were the real
ground. Id. at 538.
39. CAL. COMM. CODE ANN. § 1201(32) (West 1964). This section, which became
law January 1, 1965, repealed section 2455 of the California Corporations .Code which
defined "purchase" to include acquisitions "as mortgagee or as pledgee." Id., repealing
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, ch. 1038, § 2455, [19471 Cal. Stat. 2354 (repealed 1965).
40. Accord, Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d 535, 537-39 (Tex. 1974).
41. See McConnell v. Butler, 402 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1968), wherein the court relied
on Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935), and ignored the California
Corporations Code in denying the unsecured claims of debenture-holding former stock-
holders in bankruptcy. The "time for payment," the McConnell court held, is when as-
sets are actually passed; the exchange of debentures for stock is not payment. 402 F.2d
at 366-67.
42. 299 F. Supp. 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Eranosian v. England, .437
F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1970).
43. 299 F. Supp. at 1293. The court found that the stockholders knew of this defi-
ciency and attempted to fabricate the necessary surplus by fraudulent accounting.. This
failure to comply with section 1707(c) at the time of purchase in and of itself made the
note in Velmetals unerorceable in bankruptcy. Id,
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the beginning, precedent in California would have rendered the remain-
ing payments unenforceable upon insolvency-was gratuitous.
44
Other decisions referred to in Belmetals are equally unenlightening
on the subject of the viability of a note, given to a former stockholder
for the repurchase of shares, in bankruptcy. For example, In re Mathews
Construction Co.,"5 cited in Belmetals,46 squarely considered the stock
repurchase issue in bankruptcy since there was a valid obligation at
the inception. Mathews held that under California law the earned
surplus requirement was applicable to an installment stock repurchase
payment."' The court relied completely on Goodman v. Global In-
dustries8 but failed to consider Goodman's different factual setting.1
The stock in Goodman was initially purchased with the understand-
ing on the part of the shareholder that the corporation would buy it
back at his request. When the stockholder later exercised his option,
the corporation refused to repurchase the stock on the grounds that it
had no earned surplus and thus was not legally able to perform. The
stockholder sued the corporation on its promise to repurchase and
the court found for the corporation.5" The Goodman agreement was
thus executory on both sides. The stockholder had never parted with
any stock; the corporation had never parted with any money. The
validity of an installment repurchase in which the contract had been
executed by the stockholder but was still executory on the part of the
corporation was not at issue. Nevertheless, Mathews5 and Belmetals"2
cite Goodman as definitive on the installment repurchase issue.
The National court, unwilling to battle precedent without specific
guidance from the legislature, found Paterna's promissory note un-
enforceable on the basis of the insolvency cut-off rule and the earned
surplus requirement.53 Thus, the court turned to the lien as a way
to salvage Paterna's claim.
44. Id. at 1296.
45. 120 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
46. 299 F. Supp. at 1296.
47. 120 F. Supp. at 821.
48. 80 Cal. App. 2d 583, 182 P.2d 300 (1947).
49. 120 F. Supp. at 821.
50. 80 Cal. App. 2d at 588, 182 P.2d at 303.
51. 120 F. Supp. at 821.
52. 299 F. Supp. at 1296.
53. 537 F.2d at 330. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra for a discussion of
the statutory basis on which the note could have been found enforceable, despite recent
precedent to the contrary.
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C. The Enforceability of the Lien under California Law
The vitality of a lien in California is determined by section 2909 of
the California Civil Code, which provides:
A lien is to be deemed accessory to the act for the performance of which
it is a security, whether any person is bound for such performance or
not, and is extinguishable in like manner with any other accessory
obligation."4
Thus, where the obligation is cancelled, forgiven, or no longer exists,
the lien is extinguished. Similarly, if the original holder of a secured
promissory note transfers the note to one person and the security to
another, the holder of the note still has the benefit of the security and
the holder of the security has no benefit other than a possible action
against the seller to compel him to transfer the note also, if that was
part of the agreement. 5 Concisely stated, the lien follows the note.
California cases interpreting the validity of a lien when the note
it secures becomes unenforceable fall into two classes: those where
the note was originally invalid,56 nonexistent" or extinguished by the
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2909 (West 1974). It should be noted that the result of the
transaction would not have been significantly different under the provisions of the Cali-
fornia Commercial Code governing secured transactions in personal property. CAL.
COMM. CODE ANN. § 9101 et seq. (West 1964). Section 9201 of the commercial code
COMM. CODE ANN. § 9101 et seq. (West 1964). Section 9201 of the Commercial Code
provides that a valid security interest in personal property attaches when: (1) the
debtor has signed a security agreement containing a description of the collateral; (2)
value has been given; and (3) the debtor has rights in the collateral. The important
point here is the focus on "value" being given. Under section 1201(44) value is defined
in part as "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." CAL. COMM.
CODE ANN. § 1201(44)(d) (West Supp. 1976). Therefore, once these initial steps
have been taken a valid security interest is taken in the debtor's property. The com-
mercial code does not confront the situation where the underlying "value" later becomes
"unenforceable" or "insufficient to support a simple contract."
There would appear to be two possible consequences of this conflict under the provi-
sions of the commercial code. First, section 9201 contains the general provision up-
holding the validity of a security interest, "[elxcept as otherwise provided by this code
a security agreement is effective according to its terms . . . ." Therefore, the security
interest "lien" if validly given, would appear to be unaffected by the underlying consid-
eration later becoming insufficient. However, it is possible that the term "except as
otherwise provided" could be interpreted to mean that one should look for the solution
to this problem outside the code, as provided by section 1103. CAL. COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 1103 (West 1964). This would mean using California common law on the subject,
i.e., the same problem the National court faced.
55. Kelley v. Upshaw, 39 Cal. 2d 179, 246 P.2d 23 (1952); Treat v. Burns, 216 Cal.
216, 13 P.2d 724 (1932). See generally Bernhardt, The Obligation, CAL. REAL
ESTATE SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS § 4.1 et seq. (J. Hetland ed. 1970).
56. Fleming v. Kagan, 189 Cal. App. 2d 791, 11 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1961).
57. Coon v. Shry, 209 Cal. 612, 289 P. 815 (193Q).
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maker; 8 and those where the note is simply unenforceable due to the
statute of limitations.59 A typical case of the first type is where a
decedent's will forgave money owed on a promissory note but neglected
specifically to extinguish the deed of trust held by a trustee as security
for the note. Because the lien follows the obligation, the forgiveness
of the debt extinguished the lien."
Cases of the second type, where the note is not invalid but simply
unenforceable due to the statute of limitations, produce a slightly dif-
ferent result. Although the courts have agreed that section 2909 of
the Civil Code bars a foreclosure action because the enforceability of
the lien is dependent on the enforceability of the note, they have
held that title may not be quieted against the holder of a trust deed with-
out payment of the note,6' and that where the mortgagee was in posses-
sion no ejectment action could be maintained against him.
62
As the court in National reasoned, while Paterna's note was unen-
forceable, it was not unenforceable because the note was extinguished
by the maker or invalid from its inception. Nor was it invalid due to a
mere procedural obstacle such as the statute of limitations. The note
was unenforceable, as the court interpreted it, because of a substantive
rule of California law, a more serious ground for unenforceability than
the statute of limitations, but less serious than original invalidity. 5
Finding no precedent directly on point, the court examined the reasons
behind the unenforceability of the note and ruled that they were not
sufficient to merit extinction of the lien along with the extinction of the
note. 4
One may question the consequences of a rule which permits a lien
to survive an unenforceable note. Fortunately, the survival is based
on narrow grounds. A note void from the beginning is not protected
58. Trowbridge v. Love, 58 Cal. App. 2d 746, 137 P.2d 890 (1943).
,59. Howell v. Dowling, 52 Cal. App. 2d 487, 126 P.2d 630 (1942).
60. Trowbridge v. Love, 58 Cal. App. 2d 746, 137 P.2d 890 (1943).
61. Howell v. Dowling, 52 Cal. App. 2d 487, 496, 126 P.2d 630, 635 (1942).
62. Puckhaber v. Henry, 152 Cal. 419, 423, 93 P. 114, 116 (1907).
63. 537 F.2d at 331.
64. The court's analysis parallels Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co. which the court
cites approvingly:
With no Minnesota decisions in point involving these aspects of the case, we prefer
to leave resolution [of the validity of the note] for legislative clarification and rest
our decision, as we believe the trial court did, upon the ground that the rights of the
plaintiff to the proceeds of the personal property embraced in the chattel mortgages
vested when the mortgages were executed and cannot be voided now by resort to
[the Minnesota earned surplus requirement].
153 N.W.2d at 246.
[Vol. 10
RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
by the National holding. 5 The decision protects only a lien securing
a note valid at its inception which later becomes unenforceable in bank-
ruptcy. The lien provided a narrow ground on which the court could
uphold a stock repurchase obligation and thus avoid directly over-
ruling the Belmetals insolvency cut-off rule without the specific authori-
zation of the legislature.
I. THE DECIsioN:
A NEw OUTCOME FOR THE STOCKHOLDER
The precedent-setting outcome of the National decision is high-
lighted by the underlying rationale of the court in finding the lien to
br" enforceable. The court's reasoning, as opposed to its actual hold-
ing, is directed towards finding the note to be enforceable. 60
The court maintained that California law indicated the note was
unenforceable, but earlier analysis demonstrates that the cited cases
do not necessitate such a conclusion.6" One wonders whether, if
counsel for Paterna had argued on behalf of the note's validity instead
of conceding its invalidity, the court might have looked more favorably
upon the note's enforceability, distinguishing the weak precedent to
the contrary. In addition, the court ignored an exercise of statutory
interpretation which could have provided the basis for finding the note
enforceable.68 On the other hand, the court cited and found persuasive
equally weak precedent to support the enforceability of the lien.6 9
The National decision makes sense, not on the basis of precedent,
but on the basis of policy. In upholding Paterna's claim, the court
offered a variety of reasons, none of which readily appears from prior
case law. The court noted first that the corporation could have paid
cash at the time of the transaction, since it had the necessary earned
surplus required by section 1707(c).70 Second, the court found the
transaction to be free of fraudulent dealing.71 Third, the court stated
65. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra. Whether the National holding affects
a lien where the note was extinguished is unclear but seems unlikely. See text accom
panying note 58 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 70-76 infra.
67. See text accompanying notes 41-52 supra.
68. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
69. 537 F.2d at 331.
70. Id. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1709 (West 1955), which requires the corporation
to deduct the entire purchase price from the earned surplus account, a requirement met
by National Tile & Terrazo Co. Thus, on the basis of the balance sheet, the transaction
is fully executed at that time.
71. 537 F.2d at 331.
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that the enforcement of installment repurchase agreements was neces-
sary to enable the corporation to buy its stock in the most expeditious
and convenient manner. 2 Even though earned surplus in excess of the
entire purchase price may be available, the corporation may be well-
advised to conserve some of its funds at the time of purchase. Fourth,
since Paterna had already sold her shares and therefore no longer
possessed the benefits of risk capital in terms of corporate control,
dividends, or the speculative rewards of investment, the court found
it appropriate to relieve Paterna of the risk of shareholder status in
the bankruptcy proceeding.73 Each of these explanations could apply
with equal force to support a claim based upon an unsecured obliga-
tion, a result diametrically opposed to the traditional view.
Only the court's fifth reason applies solely to a secured transaction.
The court noted that a lien, when it is recorded, supplies notice to
creditors, something a mere promissory note may not do.74 The court
reinforced this conclusion by noting that a slight change in form would
have rendered the transaction completely unassailable-namely, pay-
ment in full to the shareholder, financed in part by a third party's
secured loan to the corporation.75  This argument, while valid, may go
beyond what the court intends because it would also support the un-
secured claim of a former stockholder who could assert a similar change
in form. 76
While National may seem to be going in the back door by finding
the claim valid only because the lien is enforceable, the substantive
significance of the lien should not be overlooked. The insistence on
the presence of a lien is in fact an extension of the original common law
rule that no stock repurchase, including a stock payment due under
an installment plan, may be made if it will prejudice a creditor's legal
rights. By noting the significance of the lien, the National court recog-
nized the traditional pecking order in insolvency-namely, that un-
secured creditors have a claim only on those resources of the bankrupt
that do not have recorded liens against them. The object of the lien
72. Id. at 332.
73. Id. This qualification may result in the rejection of the claim of a stockholder
who sells less than all of his stock. However, such a result would not necessarily be
dictated by the offered interpretation of the new corporations code. See text accom-
panying notes 78-82 infra.
74. 537 F.2d at 332.
75. Id.
76. Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 153 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1967), offers an-
other example. A stockholder could take cash for his stock and then loan money back
to the corporation secured by a chattel mortgage. Id. at 247.
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is thus to give bona fide creditors notice of the continuing obligation
of an installment stock repurchase and allow them to adjust their
extension of credit accordingly.
77
IV. EFFECT OF THE NEW CALIFORNIA GENERAL CORPORATIONS
LAW ON STOCKHOLDERS' SECURED CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
The revised California Corporations Code, effective January 1,
1977, 78 would appear to have little effect on the outcome in National.
In place of the earned surplus requirement, section 500 of the new
code provides that, immediately prior to the repurchase, the corpora-
tion must have retained earnings equal to or in excess of the purchase
price; or that, immediately after giving effect to the repurchase, the
sum of the assets of the corporation must at least equal its liabilities
according to specified formulas.79 Section 501 is a slightly reworded
version of the insolvency cut-off rule. 0 Thus neither section 500 nor
section 501 sheds light on the key issue in installment repurchasing:
when are these standards to be applied?
77. First Trust Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 256 F. 830 (8th Cir. 1919); Cross v.
Beguelin, 169 N.E. 378 (1929). This reasoning would apply only to creditors subse-
quent to Paterna's recordation of the lien. The National court did not specify whether
there were creditors whose liens originated prior to this date. Bankruptcy occurred
three and one-half years after the lien recordation, and following the deduction of the
repurchase price the corporation had remaining more than $20,000 in earned surplus.
These facts made it likely that the creditors contesting Paterna's claim were subsequent
to her stock repurchase transaction.
78. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 2, § 1 et seq.
79. Section 500 reads in pertinent part:
Neither a corporation nor any of its subsidiaries shall make any distribution to the
corporation's shareholders (Section 166) unless:
(a) The amount of the retained earnings of the corporation immediately prior
thereto equals or exceeds the amount of the proposed distribution; or
(b) Immediately after giving effect thereto:
(1) The sum of the assets of the corporation (exclusive of goodwill, capitalized
research and development expenses and deferred charges) would be at least equal
to 1 4 times its liabilities (not including deferred taxes, deferred income and other
deferred credits); and
(2) The current assets of the corporation would be at least equal to its current
liabilities or, if the average of the earnings of the corporation before taxes on income
and before interest expense for the two preceding fiscal years was less than the
average of the interest expense of the corporation for such fiscal years, at least equal
to 13/4 times its current liabilities; . . .
Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 2, § 500.
80. Section 501 provides:
Neither a corporation nor any of its subsidiaries shall make any distribution to the
corporation's shareholders (Section 166) if the corporation or the subsidiary making
the distribution is, or as a result thereof would be, likely to be unable to meet its
liabilities (except those whose payment is otherwise adequately provided for) as
they mature.
Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 21 § 501,
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More relevant to this question, however, is the revised code's defi-
nition of the time of distribution:
[T]he time of any distribution by purchase or redemption of shares
shall be the date cash or property is transferred by the corporation,
whether or not pursuant to a contract of an earlier date; provided, that
where a negotiable debt security (as defined in subdivision (1) of Sec-
tion 8102 of the Commercial Code) is issued in exchange for shares
the time of the distribution is the date when the corporation acquires
the shares in such exchange. 8'
The requirements of sections 500 and 501 are both applicable at the
time of distribution, which, under this provision, is whenever cash
or property is transferred from the corporation.8 2  Thus, both the
surplus and solvency tests must be met for each payment as well as
for the initial purchase, a reaffirmation of the traditional rule.
The possible exception to this rule-the situation where a negotia-
ble debt security is given in exchange for the stock-would rarely
apply to such a transaction and does not apply in National because the
definition of negotiable debt security under the California Commercial
Code is quite limited:
(a) A "security" is an instrument which
(i) Is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) Is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or
markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or
dealt in as a medium for investment; and
(iii) Is either one of a class or series. or by its terms is divisible into
a class or series of instruments; and
(iv) Evidences a share, participation or other interest in property
or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer.88
Thus, under the new Corporations Code, the holding in National would
still rest on the viability of the lien and not the enforceability of the
note.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in In re National Tile & Terrazzo Co. will have a
definite and continuing impact on corporations, their stockholders, and
their creditors. Small corporations, most importantly, will have more
freedom in repurchasing stock on an installment basis. Wise shareholders
wil not be reluctant to enter into such an agreement which formerly
81. Id. § 166.
82. Id.
83. CAL. COMM. CODE ANN, § 8102(1)(a) (West 1964).
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would have placed them in an inferior status to creditors. Creditors, on
the other hand, potentially could get a smaller piece of the pie in a
bankruptcy proceeding.
8 4
This departure from the majority rule is, however, not as radical
as it might have been. By narrowly finding that the lien was enforce-
able, despite the unenforceable note, the Ninth Circuit avoided the
direct overruling of California precedent while offering the former
stockholder a way to recover on his claim."5
The new California Corporations Code is marred by the same pit-
falls as the old for the installment repurchase transaction. 6 Thus,
one may assume that the security interest found valid in National will
become an important way to circumvent a bad result for the former
stockholder. Courts applying the holding of National will find a for-
mer stockholder's claim provable in bankruptcy as a creditor if (1) the
debt is secured; (2) there is no evidence of fraud; and (3) the new
statutory requirements for surplus are met at the time the corporation
repurchased the stock. This relaxation of the requirement that suffi-
cient earned surplus and solvency be present both at the time of pur-
chase and at the time of payment will facilitate stock repurchase trans-
actions and bring the law more in line with prevailing business practice.
Diana K. Smith
84. Judge Goodwin, in dissent, worried that the National decision could "frustrate
present and future creditors of other small, closely held corporations." 537 F.2d at 333
(Goodwin, J., dissenting).
85. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
86. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 2, § 166. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying
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